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COMMENTS
LANDOWNER'S LIABILITY TO INFANT TRESPASSERS:
STATUS OF THE LAW IN NEW YORK
I. INTRODUCTION
It has often been held that a landowner is under no duty, as to trespassers,
to place his land in reasonably safe condition or to conduct his activities so
as not to injure them.' The authorities reason that since the landowner2 is
protected in his exclusive possession and has the right to fix the terms upon
which anyone may enter, those who come upon his land without permission
have no right to expect that he will safeguard them in their unlawful use
of his property. 3 Other authorities take the position that no duty is owed
to a trespasser because his coming is not foreseeable and in any event the
owner has assumed no relation towards him and derives no benefit from his
presence.4 Although this rule has remained substantially inviolate, courts have
recognized the harshness of an absolute rule which subordinates human safety
to the unrestrained use of land, and have accordingly created certain excep-
tions.
Probably the first exception to be developed was that an occupier of land
could not intentionally inflict injury upon a trespasser. 5 The great majority
of courts have extended this view by imposing on the owner a duty to use
ordinary care so as not to injure a trespasser once his presence becomes
1. Kleinberg v. Schween, 134 App. Div. 493, 495, 119 N.Y. Supp. 239, 241 (Ist Dep't
1909), aff'd, 198 N.Y. 619, 92 N.E. 1089 (1910); Birch v. City of New York, 190 N.Y. 397,
403, 83 N.E. 51, 53 (1907). See also Prosser, Torts § 76 (2d ed. 1955); James, Tort
Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 Yale L.J. 144 (1953);
Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 Temple L.Q. 32 (1937).
2. However, no immunity from liability is given to one who is neither the possessor nor
his licensee. Wittleder v. Citizens Electric Illuminating Co., 47 App. Div. 410, 62 N.Y.
Supp. 297 (2d Dep't 1900), aff'd on reargument, 50 App. Div. 478, 64 N.Y. Supp. 114
(2d Dep't 1900); Guinn v. Delaware and Atlantic Telephone Co., 72 N.J.L. 276, 62 At.
412 (1905); Restatement, Torts § 386 (1934).
3. Note that this is really another way of stating that a trespasser is deemed to assume
the risks consequent to trespassing. Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N.Y. 181, 179 N.E.2d 378
(1932).
4. Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in
Tort, 21 Mich. L. Rev. 495, 505 (1923). Other bases for denying recovery are that the
plaintiff by his trespass has contributed to his own injury or that as a wrongdoer he may
not recover for the consequences of his own wrong. Prosser, Torts § 76 (2d ed. 1955).
But see Smith, Liability of Landowner to Children Entering Without Permission, 11
Harv. L. Rev. 349, 368 (1898): "The decision turns, not upon the presence of fault in the
plaintiff, but upon the absence of fault in the defendant. The plaintiff's action is defeated,
not because his own wrong bars a recovery against the landowner who has neglected to
perform a duty owing to him, but because he has not succeeded in establishing the primary
proposition that the landowner owed to him the duty in question."
5. Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1828); State v. Green, 118 S.C.
279, 110 S.E. 145 (1921).
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known.6 Another exception has been created where the owner has knowledge
that persons frequently trespass over a limited part of his land, on the theory
that injuries to them, as a result of his unreasonable use of the land, is plainly
foreseeable.7 Lastly, the courts have established the doctrine, with which this
article is primarily concerned, that an infant trespasser may recover for in-
juries received as a result of a condition maintained on land by the owner
under circumstances which would not give rise to liability to an adult.
A modem statement of this doctrine is that an owner is subject to liability
for: (1) a child's injuries, (2) due to the maintenance of a dangerous con-
dition,8 (3) in a place where he knows children are likely to trespass, (4)
coupled with knowledge on his part that it constitutes an unreasonable risk
as to them, and (5) where the children are incapable, because of their age,
either to discover the condition or appreciate the danger it involves.0 To the
chagrin of many legal authorities,10 the doctrine in its early development
took on the name "attractive nuisance". This choice of terminology is es-
pecially unfortunate today since the doctrine neither requires that the con-
dition or instrumentality causing the injury be a nuisance in the legal sense
of that term11 nor need it be attractive to the extent of inducing the tres-
pass in the first instance.'2
6. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Metzner, 150 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1945); Frederick v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 136, 10 A.2d 576 (1940).
7. Cheslock v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 363 Pa. 157, 69 Ai2d 103 (1949); Smith v. Boston
& Maine R.R., 87 N.H. 246, 177 AUt. 729 (1935); Carter v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co, 114
S.C. 517, 104 S.E. 186 (1920). But see Boday v. New York N.H. & H. R.R., 53 R.L
207, 165 AUt. 448 (1933).
8. The doctrine has almost always been limited to artificial as distinguished from natural
conditions. Fitch v. Selwyn Village, Inc., 234 N.C. 632, 63 S.E.2d 255 (1951); Bagby v.
Kansas City, 338 Mo. 771, 92 S.W.2d 142 (1936). Moreover, there has been a tendency to
deny the application of the doctrine to conditions merely duplicating natural conditions.
Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co., 228 Ind. 518, 92 N.E.Zd 632 (1950); Stendal v. Boyd, 73
Minn. 53, 75 N.W. 735 (1898). Contra, Altenbach v. Lehigh Valley R.R, 349 Pa. 272,
37 A.2d 429 (1944).
9. Restatement, Torts § 339 (1934). This authority sets forth the additional require-
ment that the utility of the condition be slight in comparison with the risk involved.
10. Prosser, Torts § 76 (2d ed. 1955).
11. "Since, so far as the Courts of the United States are concerned, these cas2s are all
assumed to rest on Railroad Co. v. Stout, (citation omitted), the word 'nuisance' is in-
appropriate. A nuisance is that which 'unlawfully worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage,'
and neither the turntable of the Stout case nor the electric wire here to be considered was
a nuisance; both were lawful enough. But many a lawful thing may be so negligently man-
aged, handled, or maintained as to give rise to causes of action in tort. The true doctrine
is that any composition of matter which lures or attracts the confiding ignorance of child-
hood to its own harm must be safeguarded as circumstances require, and of course the
circumstances vary in almost every instance." New York N.H. & H. R.R. v. Fruchter,
271 Fed. 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 US. 141 (1922).
12. Weber v. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co., 214 Binn. 1, 7 N.W.2d 339 (1942);
Verrichia v. Society Di M. S. Del Lazio, 366 Pa. 629, 79 A.2d 237 (1951); Banker v. Mc-
Laughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843 (1948). However, some jurisdictions still require,
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Various arguments have been advanced both in support and in condemna-
tion of this doctrine. Its proponents insist that, in view of the immature judg-
ment of a child and his inability to appreciate the risks consequent to tres-
passing, the doctrine of contributory negligence has no application;' 8 it is
more practicable to impose a duty of looking out for the straying child upon
the landowner rather than on the parent, notwithstanding it may result in
slight inconvenience to the former; 14 the "attraction" constitutes an implied
invitation to the infant; 15 in view of the tender years of the infant he should
not be considered a trespaser;' 8 the maintenance of the condition constitutes
a trap or concealed danger as to the infant; 7 or that a landowner is under
a general duty to use care in avoiding injuries to others, even in respect to
the use of his own realty.'8
On the other hand, its opponents argue that the rule places an onerous
burden on landowners;1' that it is founded in sympathy rather than in law or
logic; 2 0 that it is the product of indulgence in legal fictions; 2' and that the
inclination of a jury to favor the injured child over the landowner sufficiently
warrants its rejection.22
as a condition to recovery, that the infant be enticed upon the premises by the condition
or instrumentality which injured him. Esquibel v. City and County of Denver, 112 Colo.
546, 151 P.2d 757 (1944); Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 130 S.W.2d 623 (1939); Prosser,
Torts § 76 (2d ed. 1955).
13. Thomas v. Chicago, Minneapolis and St. Paul Ry., 93 Iowa 248, 61 N.W. 967
(1895) (infant 3 years and 10 months old as matter of law cannot be guilty of contribu-
tory negligence).
14. Prosser, Torts § 76 (2d ed. 1955). But for a contrary view see Smith, Liability of
Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 349, 372 (1898):
"If those who brought the child into the world are unable, by reason of poverty, to pro-
vide him a playground, this may afford an argument for the passage of a statute imposing
that duty upon the municipality, in which case each landowner would have to contribute
his proportion of the expense. But this is quite another thing from assessing upon a single
unfortunate landowner the entire damage arising from the want of such a playground."
15. McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401, 100 N.E. 168 (1912); Dahl v. Valley Dredging
Co., 125 Minn. 90, 145 N.W. 796 (1914).
16. Lewis v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 42 Ind. App. 337, 84 N.E. 23 (App.
Ct. of Ind. 1908); Lynchburg Telephone Co. v. Booker, 103 Va. 594, 50 S.E. 148 (1905).
17. Faylor v. Great Eastern Quicksilver Mining Co., 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101
(Dist. Ct. of Appeal 1919).
18. "His (the occupier's) obligation is simply that which attaches to every member
of society when he undertakes to exercise a personal right in a manner which may affect
the welfare or safety of another member,-the obligation of reasonable care." Edgington v.
Burlington, C.R. & N. Ry., 116 Iowa 410, 422, 90 N.W. 95, 99 (1902). Contra, "The
maxim that a man must use his property so as not to incommode his neighbor only
applies to neighbors who do not interfere with it or enter upon it." Frost v. Eastern R.R.,
64 N.H. 220, 222, 9 At. 790, 791 (1887).
19. Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 Ad. 858 (1911).
20. Ibid.
21. Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility In
Tort, 21 Mich. L. Rev. 495, 508 (1923).
22. Cf. Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission, 11
Harv. L. Rev. 434, 439 (1898).
H1. HISTORY
The doctrine of attractive nuisance as we know it today was foreshadowed
in England with the decision in Lynch v. NurdinP In the Lynch case, de-
fendant's servant had left his horse and cart unattended in the street. Plain-
tiff, a seven year old infant, climbed on the cart and was injured when an-
other child led the horse away, causing plaintiff to fall into the street. In
allowing a recovery for plaintiff, the court cited several cases 4 in which it
was recognized that a landowner may be liable for intentional injuries in-
flicted upon a trespasser.es Conscious of the distinction between such cases
and the one at bar, the court nevertheless reasoned that the line between
wilful mischief and gross negligence is difficult, if not impossible, to define.
The decision26 is important in that it laid down the rule that an owner of
property owes a duty of care to a trespasser beyond that of merely refraining
from inflicting wilful and wanton injury upon him.
The doctrine originated in the United States in Railroad Co. v. Stout -
although the Court in that case cited two American decisions 2 5 in addition
to that of Lynch v. iyurdin, as authority for the proposition that a landowner
is liable for injuries to infant trespassers due to dangerous conditions main-
tained on his land.29 In the Stout case liability was predicated on the negli-
23. 1 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
24. flott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Aid. 304, 106 Eng. Rep. 674 (1820); Bird v. Holbrook, 4
Bing. 62S, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1828); Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taunton 4S9, 129 Eng. Rep.
196 (1817) (injury to plaintiff's dog, caused by a spike placed on defendant's land for pro-
tection of his preserves).
25. It should be noted that while the Lynch case involved a trespass to personalty, the
cases cited by the court are concerned with trespass to real property and thus are not
directly in point.
26. A subsequent decision, Hughes v. Mlacfie, 2 H. & C. 744, 159 Eng. Rep. 303 (1863),
is apparently contra. But in Harrold v. Watney, 2 Q.B. 320, 322 (1393), it was Eaid that
the Lynch case has never been overruled.
27. 84 US. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
28. Birge v. Gardner, 19 Conn. 507 (1849); Daley v. Norwich and Worcceter R.R..
26 Conn. 591 (1858).
29. It is to be noted that the Court in the Stout case failed to distinguish Lynch v.
Nurdin as involving trespass to personal rather than real property. However, in Walsh v.
Fitchburg R.R., 145 N.Y. 301, 312, 39 N.E. 1063, 1072 (1895), the court distinguished
Lynch v. Nurdin from the case at bar as follows: "The defendant in the one (Lynch) case
was not upon his own land nor was he engaged in the proper transaction of his busine:s
thereon, but, on the contrary, he was in a public street and improperly left his horse and
cart therein unattended and where others, and among them children, had the same right
to be that he had. In the case of this defendant, on the other hand, the turntable was
on its own land, it was a proper and appropriate machine for the carrying on of its busi-
ness, it was properly made and it was properly used by the defendant n Although this
distinction is a proper one and Lynch v. Nurdin is obviously no direct authority for up-
holding a landowner's liability to a trespassing child, the overwhelming acceptance of
attractive nuisance seems to have rendered such question moot. See note 51 infra.
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gence of the defendant in failing to lock its turntable; 30 hence the rule allow-
iag recovery in these cases has often been referred to as the "turntable doc-
trine."'3 While the great majority of jurisdictions accept the doctrine, 82 most
of the industrial states83 have rejected it, apparently considering it too bur-
densome on normal business enterprise.
III. DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YoRc
In New York, although the doctrine was accepted in 1874 in Mullaney v.
Spence,3 4 it was ignored three years later in McAlpin v. Powell,85 and subse-
quently repudiated in Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R.,80 on facts substantially similar
to those in the Stout case. In refusing to follow the rationale of the Stout
case, the court took the position that while defendant owed plaintiff ". .. a
duty to abstain from injuring him either intentionally or by failing to exer-
cise reasonable care, . . . it did not owe him the duty of active vigilance to
see that he was not injured while upon its land merely by permission for his
own convenience." 37  Since the Walsh decision, the New York courts have
often rejected attractive nuisance as part of the law of New York;38 although,
such rejection is far from absolute in fact, and in view of a recent decision
of the Court of Appeals,39 it would seem that the trend is to extend rather
30. Clearly there is much logical support for the rule announced by the case; however,
the means by which the Court arrived at its decision is highly questionable. It is estab-
lished that in order to recover in tort on the theory of negligence it must be shown that
a duty of care was owing from defendant to plaintiff, that such duty was breached and
that consequent harm resulted to the plaintiff. Examination of the opinion will show that
the Court assumed that there was such a duty owing to the plaintiff, the major part of the
opinion being an attempt to show that the jury rightly found, under the circumstances,
that the defendant had not used reasonable care in guarding its turntable. For criticism
of the case see Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 91 Tex. 60, 41 S.W. 62 (1897).
Nevertheless, in view of the frequency with which the case has been followed (see Annot.,
36 AL.R. 69 (1925)) it seems clear that such criticism has not measurably detracted from
its authority.
31. See Annot., 36 A.L.R. 38 (1925).
32. Annot., 36 A.L.R. 69 (1925).
33. Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110, 193 Atl. 608 (1937); State v. Baltimore Fidelity
Warehouse Co., 176 Md. 341, 4 A.2d 739 (1939); Urban v. Central Massachusetts Electric
Co., 301 Mass. 519, 17 N.E.2d 718 (1938); Ryan v. Towar, 128 Mich. 463, 87 N.W. 644
(1901); Turess v. New York, S. & W. R.R., 61 N.J.L. 314, 40 Ad. 614 (1898); Morse v.
Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. 110, 19 N.E.2d 981 (1939); Wheeling & L.E. R.R. v.
Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907); Previte v. Wanskuck Co., 80 R.I. 1, 90 A.2d
769 (1952).
34. 15 Abb. Pr. (ns.) 319 (City of B'klyn Gen. Term 1874).
35. 70 N.Y. 126 (1877).
36. 145 N.Y. 301, 39 N.E. 1068 (1895).
37. Id. at 306, 39 N.E. at 1069.
38. Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. 110, 19 N.E.2d 981 (1939); Carbone v.
Mackchil Realty Corp., 296 N.Y. 154, 71 N.E.2d 447 (1947); Counias v. Thomas, 247 App.
Div. 117, 285 N.Y. Supp. 906 (1st Dep't 1936), appeal denied, 272 N.Y. 597, 4 N.E.2d 821
(1936).
39. Mayer v. Temple Properties, Inc., 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954).
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than restrict the liability of an occupier for injuries to trespassing children in-
curred as a result of conditions created by him.
The state of the law of attractive nuisance in New York may be best treated
by noting the more important cases in which recovery has been allowed and
attempting to classify them according to the rationale on which each is based.
The first notable exception to the New York rule of non-liability allows
recovery to one who is injured by an inherently dangerous instrumentality4°
which the defendant has maintained on his property. This exception was
developed in the leading case of Travell v. BanncrnanA1 In that case, the de-
fendant, proprietor of a gun and ammunition factory, was in the habit of
using an adjoining lot owned by him for the purpose of dumping refuse accu-
mulated in the factory. It appeared that the plaintiff, though not on de-
fendant's premises, was approached by two boys carrying a mass of material
composed of caked gunpowder and old cannon primers which they had found
on defendant's land. In attempting to extract the pieces of brass contained in
the mass one of the boys pounded it with a rock, producing an explosion
which injured the plaintiff. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff the Ap-
pellate Division concluded that the mass of gunpowder and bras was in-
herently dangerous and thus required the defendants to exercise a high degree
of care with respect to it. Although not saying so, the decision was apparently
based upon the principles of attractive nuisance, the court finding that the
defendant had failed to exercise care in depositing this material on the vacant
lot, that the material in question would inevitably entice children to come upon
the premises to play with it, and that the natural and probable result of
such play would be injury to a child.
The reasoning of the Travell case was followed by Kingsland v. Erie Counly
Agricultural SoC'y,42 in which the plaintiff, as in the Travell case, was an
innocent third person who was injured outside of defendant's premises as a
consequence of an infant's trespass. In the Kingsland case the court explained
the rationale of the inherently dangerous instrumentality cases as follows: 43
"One who keeps an explosive substance is 'bound to the e-xercise of a high
40. Kingsland v. Erie County Agricultural Society, 29S N.Y. 409, 84 N.E2d 38 (1949);
Travell v. Bannerman, 71 App. Div. 439, 75 N.Y. Supp. 866 (3d Dep't 1902), rev'd on
other grounds, 174 N.Y. 47, 66 N.E. 583 (1903); French v. Central New York Power
Corp., 275 App. Div. 23S, 89 N.Y.S.2d 543 (4th Dep't 1949). Cf. Sarrapin v. S. & S.
Corrugated Paper Machinery Co., Inc., 209 App. Div. 377, 204 N.Y. Supp. 778 (2d Dep't
1924); Morrison v. N.Y. Telephone Co., 277 N.Y. 444, 14 N.E2d 785 (1938) (complaint
alleging death of plaintiff's intestate, an adult, resulting from contact with bare wires on
defendant's pole stated a cause of action). "The rule seems to be thoroughly fettled, at least
in this State, that a plaintiff cannot recover ... unless the article which causes the injury
is inherently dangerous." Beickert v. G.M. Laboratories, 242 N.Y. 16S, 172, 151 N.E. 195,
196 (1926).
41. 71 App. Div. 439, 75 N.Y. Supp. 866 (3d Dep't 1902), rev'd on other grounds, 174
N.Y. 47, 66 N.E. 583 (1903). See also Kingsland v. Erie County Agricultural Society, 293
N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949).
42. 298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949).
43. Id. at 423-24, 84 N.E.2d at 45.
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degree of care to so keep it as to prevent injury to others.144 (Travell v. Ban-
nerman, 174 N.Y. 47, 51). The degree of care required is commensurate with
the risk involved, depending upon such circumstances as the 'dangerous
character of the material' and its accessibility to others,"4 particularly children
whose presence should have been anticipated, regardless of whether or not
they are trespassers." Subsequent to the Travell case, recovery has also been
granted to the trespassing infant himself when he was injured by an inher-
ently dangerous instrumentality maintained on defendant's land.40 It would
appear that the latter class of cases falls directly within the attractive nui-
sance doctrine; that is, the occupier of land is responsible for injuries to
trespassing children due to a dangerous condition which he maintains on his
land when their coming is foreseeable. In addition, the landowner must have
knowledge that the risk attending the condition is unreasonable as to children,
and that because of their immaturity children are unable to discover or ap-
preciate the danger involved.47
New York has always recognized that one responsible for the existence of
a dangerous instrumentality or condition in or near a public place owes a duty
to exercise reasonable care in respect to those lawfully using the street. Within
this class, there may be found two distinct lines of cases: First, those in which
the duty is owing to both adult and child alike, e.g., where the defendant has
negligently placed near to a public street an obstruction or excavation dan-
gerous to those passing proximate thereto; 48 secondly, those in which the duty
is owing to children alone, e.g., where the defendant negligently permits a
dangerous condition to exist, 40 or negligently leaves property in a street 0
44. In view of the broad language used here, it might be reasoned that the court would
grant recovery to an adult who is injured by a dangerous instrumentality which a land-
owner has negligently permitted to exist on his property. Cf. Morrison v. N.Y. Telephone
Co., 277 N.Y. 444, 14 N.E.2d 785 (1935). See note 40 supra.
45. This language suggests that recovery might be permitted where an adult takes a
dangerous instrumentality from the premises of another and thereby injures an innocent
third party, provided negligence is shown. It should be noted that such a view would
support the rule that one may sometimes be bound to foresee the criminal act of another.
See Prosser, Torts § 49 (2d ed. 1955).
46. French v. Central New York Power Corp., 275 App. Div. 238, 89 N.Y.S.2d 543
(4th Dep't 1949); Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (2d
Dep't 1953). See also Mayer v. Temple Properties, Inc., 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909
(1954).
47. Compare this definition with that given in 36 A.L.R. 38 (1925).
48. Beck v. Carter, 68 N.Y. 283 (1877); Storrs v. Utica, 17 N.Y. 104 (1858); Demlng
v. Terminal Ry. of Buffalo, 169 N.Y. 1, 61 N.E. 983 (1901).
49. Robertson v. Rockland Light and Power Co., 187 App. Div. 720, 176 N.Y. Supp.
281 (1st Dep't 1919); Meehan v. Adirondack Power Corp., 88 Misc. 235, 150 N.Y. Supp.
714 (Sup. Ct. 1914). Cf. Barr v. Green, 210 N.Y. 252, 104 N.E. 619 (1914) (negligence to
place barbed wire fence on boundary line in violation of law in vicinity of school when
one of children accustomed to trespass and play there was injured by coming in contact
therewith).
50. Connell v. Berland, 223 App. Div. 234, 228 N.Y. Supp. 20 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 248
N.Y. 641, 162 N.E. 557 (1928); Ramsey v. National Contracting Co., 49 App. Div. 11, 63
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which appeals to them and which constitutes an unreasonable risk as to them.
It is only the second class of cases which fall within the doctrine since only
in such cases is there intentional intermeddling with the property in ques-
tion.5  In Robertson v. Rockland Light and Power Co.,02 where, on climbing
defendant's pole, an infant was electrocuted when he came in contact with bare
wires which defendant had suffered to exist, the court, in granting recovery
said: "I think there is a material difference between trespassing upon private
premises and using private property left unguarded and unattended either
temporarily or permanently in a public highway... and the Court of Appeals
had distinctly recognized that the turntable doctrine has not yet been ex-
tended to a dangerous appliance, in, or a dangerous condition in a public
street.' 15 3 Thus it is clear that New York courts, while rejecting the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine in general, nevertheless make exceptions in regard to in-
herently dangerous articles and property maintained or left in a public street
or way. Clearly the distinction is realistic since the arguments that (1) the
attractive nuisance doctrine places an onerous burden on landowners and
(2) the coming of the trespasser is not foreseeable, 4 are inapplicable where
the dangerous instrumentality or condition exists in or near a public place.
In a third class of cases, the New York courts have permitted recovery
by an infant for injuries sustained as a result of a condition on the land
based on the theory that his presence there was not wrongful but pursuant
to an implied invitation of the defendant.s It should be noted that such a
theory is precisely equivalent to the reasoning on which some states permit
recovery in all cases arising within their jurisdiction under the attractive
nuisance doctrine.56 A common fact in each of the cases within this class
N.Y. Supp. 2S6 (2d Dep't 1900); Tierney v. New York Dugan Brothers, 283 N.Y. 16, 41
N.E.2d 161 (1942); Murnane v. Third Ave. R.R., 172 N.Y. Supp. 183 (App. T. 1st
Dep't 1913); Boylhart v. Di larco and Reimann, Inc., 270 N.Y. 217, 200 N.E. 793 (1936);
Kunz v. City of Troy, 104 N.Y. 344, 10 N.E. 442 (1387); Long v. City of Dunkirh, 2C0
N.Y. 599, 134 N.E. 109 (1932).
51. Moreover, it will be seen that within such class may be found cases involving
trespass to personal as well as real property. Although the attractive nuisance doctrine in
the strict sense embraces only trespasses to land, trespasses to chattels in public places
are often considered in connection with it since substantially the same elements are in-
volved.
52. 187 App. Div. 720, 176 N.Y. Supp. 281 (1st Dep't 1919).
53. Id. at 728, 176 N.Y. Supp. at 287. Evidently the court was using the term "turn-
table doctrine" not as the equivalent of the attractive nuisance doctrine, but in reference
to the New York rule of non-liability to children injured by a turntable on a railroad's
premises.
54. See note 4 supra.
55. Collentine v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 119, 17 N.E.2d 792 (1933); Dor2y v.
Chautauqua Institution, 203 App. Div. 251, 196 N.Y. Supp. 798 (4th Dep't 1922). Cf.
Parnell v. Holland Furnace Co., 234 App. Div. 567, 256 N.Y. Supp. 323 (4th Dep't), aff'd,
260 N.Y. 604, 184 N.E. 112 (1932); Bowers v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co, 282 N.Y.
442, 26 N.E.2d 970 (1940).
56. See Annot, 36 A.LX. 114 (1925).
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would seem to be the inconclusiveness as to whether the infant is on the prop-
erty as trespasser, licensee or invitee. This gives the courts an opportunity
to seize on facts from which an invitation to the child might fairly be implied.
Such facts are the attractiveness of the condition causing the injuries com-
plained of and the frequent trespassing by children without rebuke from the
owner, although within his knowledge, actual 7 or constructive."8 Once the
court has rationalized the infant's status into that of an invitee, little diffi-
culty is encountered in finding for him, since, a greater duty of care is owed
to an invitee than to a licensee or trespasser, the last class in general taking
the land in the condition in which it exists at the time of the entry.59 In
Collentine v. City of New York, 60 the defendant maintained a large building
in a public park in Manhattan. The infant plaintiff received his injuries while
at play when he tripped over a protruding iron bar on the roof and fell into
an areaway. In an action to recover for such injuries the Court of Appeals
held that the complaint was improperly dismissed on the ground that the
infant was a trespasser where the evidence showed that there was no barri-
cade to the roof from the southerly stairs; that no clear line of demarcation
separated this from other park facilities and that the roof had frequently been
used by both children and adults6 ' for recreational purposes. Regarding the
plaintiff's status on the property, the court said quite significantly: "There
was evidence from which it might be found that there was a clear invitation,
either express or implied, to children playing in the park and rightfully there
to run up the steps of the building where the accident occurred and play
on the roof. Neither the injured boy nor these children could be deemed tres-
passers or mere licensees as matter of law."
62
The chief objection that may be raised to these decisions is that the courts,
while failing to recognize the attractive nuisance doctrine with its attendant
duty to trespassing children, reach substantially the same result by indulging
in legal fictions and round-robin reasoning.
It should be noted that frequently the New York courts explain that the
only duties which a landowner owes to a trespasser or bare licensee is to ab-
57. Collentine v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 119, 17 N.E.2d 792 (1938); Bowers v.
City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 282 N.Y. 442, 26 N.E.2d 970 (1940).
58. Bowers v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 282 N.Y. 442, 26 N.E.2d 970 (1940).
59. "Where a person goes upon the premises of another without invitation, but simply
as a bare licensee, and the owner of the property, passively, acquiesces in his coming, if
an injury is sustained by reason of a mere defect in the premises, the owner is not liable
for negligence; for such person has taken all the risk upon himself." Mendelowltz v.
Neisner, 258 N.Y. 181, 184, 179 N.E. 378, 379 (1932).
60. 279 N.Y. 119, 17 N.E.2d 792 (1938).
61. In view of (1) defendant's knowledge that adults as well as children used the roof
and (2) the court's statement that defendant was bound to exercise reasonable care to see
that the building was safe for the use of persons rightfully there, it might be inferred
that the court would extend the implied invitation theory to adults in the proper circum-
stances. See Id. at 124-25, 17 N.E.2d at 795. Cf. Dorsey v. Chautauqua Institution, 203 App.
Div. 251, 196 N.Y. Supp. 798 (4th Dep't 1922).
62. 279 N.Y. at 124, 17 N.E.2d at 795 (1938).
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stain from affirmative acts of negligence and not to intentionally injure him.c
However, from an examination of the decisions in which infant-plaintiffs have
been successful,64 it is apparent that each one falls directly within one of the
aforementioned exceptions and although the defendant's negligence may have
been affirmative rather than passivees the courts seem to give no added weight
to such fact. 6 Ioreover, many of the cases allowing recovery have involved
mere passive negligence, 67 indicating that affirmative negligence is not a
sine qua non to recovery in these cases. Hence, it is contended that such
facts as the inherently dangerous character of the instrumentality, the prox-
imity of a dangerous condition to a public place, or, the inconclusiveness of
the infant's status as trespasser, licensee, or invitee rather than the affirma-
tive character of the defendant's negligence have been thus far the principal
63. Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 2S0 N.Y. 110, 19 N.E.2d 931 (1939); Vaughn v.
Transit Development Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 118 N.E. 219 (1917).
64. See cases cited notes 40, 49, 50, and 55 supra.
65. Outside of the attractive nuisance doctrine a landowner, as in the case of a tres-
passer, is not liable to a licensee for mere passive negligence. Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258
N.Y. 181, 179 N.E. 378 (1932). The rule respecting affirmative negligence is apparently to
the contrary. Barrett v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 13 App. Div. 109, 176 N.Y. Supp.
590 (2d Dep't 1919), aff'd, 231 N.Y. 605, 132 N.E. 906 (1921). But once the tresp""ers
presence actually becomes known, the majority of courts hold that the landowner must take
care not to injure him through his affirmative acts of negligence. See note 6 supra. Cf.
Rosenthal v. New York, S. & W. R.R., 112 App. Div. 431, 9S N.Y. Supp. 476 (Ist
Dep't 1906). Evidently liability to a licensee for active negligence is put on the ground
that the landowner, having given the license, should anticipate the licensee's presence.
However, since the licensee comes for his own purposes and the landowner derives no
benefit from his presence, the law has refused to place on him a duty to inspect (active
vigilance) as to the licensee, and the latter, like the trespasser, is said to take the land in
the condition he finds it at the time of his entry. Mendelovwtz v. Neisner, supra. This last
statement is subject to the qualification that the owner is under a duty to warn the licensee
of all concealed dangers of which he has knowledge and which would not he obvious to
the licensee. Byrne v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R.R., 104 N.Y. 362, 10 N.E. 539 (1S37). The
duty owed to the invitee embraces that owed to the licensee, and in addition includes the
obligation of making reasonable inspection for latent defects in the property and rendering
the premises safe for him. Haefeli v. Woodrich Engineering Co., 255 N.Y. 442, 175 N.E.
123 (1931). This additional duty can be justified on the ground that the ovner derives a
direct benefit from the presence of the invitee.
66. Contra, Mayer v. Temple Properties, Inc., 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E2d 909 (19S4).
However, in some of the cases in which recovery was denied, the courts have stres ed the
fact that there was no evidence of affirmative acts of negligence, indicating that the result
would have been otherwise if there had been. See Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 296
N.Y. 154, 76 N.E.2d 447 (1947); Heskell v. Auburn Light, Heat and Power Co, 209 N.Y.
86, 102 N.E. 540 (1913). Cf. Cusick v. Adams, 115 N.Y. 55, 21 N.E. 673 (1889).
67. Collentine v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 119, 17 N.E.2d 792 (1938); Runkel v.
City of New York, 2S2 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (2d Dep't 1953); Robertson v.
Rockland Light and Power Co., 187 App. Div. 720, 176 N.Y. Supp. 281 (1st Dep't 1919);
Morrison v. New York Telephone Co., 277 N.Y. 444, 14 N.E.2d 785 (1938); Meehan v.
Adirondack Electric Power Corp., 88 Misc. 235, 150 N.Y. Supp. 714 (Sup. CL 1914).
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factors influencing the New York courts to depart from their traditional rule
of non-liability for injuries to trespassing children.
IV. RECENT TRENDS
The most recent expression on this subject by the N.Y. Court of Appeals is
found in the case of Mayer v. Temple Properties, Inc.08 In that case the de-
fendant maintained in the rear of its premises, an ash can hoistway fifty-five
feet in depth and protruding three and one half feet above the surface of
the ground. At the time of the accident the hoist area, designed to be cov-
ered by two steel doors, was covered on one side by wooden slats, in-
sufficient to hold the weight of a small boy. The plaintiff's intestate, a boy
of twelve years of age, came onto the premises to play and met his death by
falling through the opening so covered. In affirming a judgment for the plain-
tiff the Court of Appeals asserted that to cover a hole of such depth with
flimsy pieces of wood under the circumstances constituted ". . .an affirmative
creation of a situation pregnant with the greatest danger to life or limb, and
a deceptive trap to the unwary, as perilous as an explosive bomb, highly in-
flammable material, a spring gun, or kindred devices."6 9 The quoted language
is typical of that used by the court and, as will be noted, mentions three dis-
tinct grounds under which a landowner may incur liability to an infant tres-
passer (viz., affirmative negligence, the inherently dangerous instrumentality
rule, and the "trap doctrine"), 70 with the result that the rationale of the case
is far from clear. In view of this and of the unprecedented conditions under
which the Court of Appeals allowed a recovery, further analysis of the case
and a discussion of its probable impact on New York law would seem war-
ranted.
Previously, cases 7' have been mentioned in which the courts have found the
injured infant to be an implied invitee on the ground, among others, that the
occupier had knowledge of his presence and tolerated it. In the Mayer case,
it could not reasonably be said that the defendant had even acquiesced in the
decedent's coming, as its property was enclosed and its servant had on occa-
sions chased trespassing children from the premises. 72 Clearly then, the infant
68. 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954).
69. Id. at 565, 122 N.E.2d at 913.
70. See Bohlen and Burns, The Privilege to Protect Property by Dangerous Barriers and
Mechanical Devices, 35 Yale L.J. 525, 526 (1926).
71. See note 55 supra.
72. It appeared that children had gained access to defendant's property by crawling
under a gate which cleared the concrete pavement by 8Y2 to 12 inches. The court did say
that although defendant had knowledge of the tendency of children to crawl under the gate
and play on the platform of the hoistway, the clearance between the bottom of the gate
and the pavement nevertheless remained undisturbed. Although such facts may have some
bearing on the foreseeability of the trespass and even of the injuries themselves, it could
hardly be said that the failure to erect walls around one's premises constitutes an implied
invitation to infants to come upon the premises, nor does it suggest that the owner has
given permission to them to enter. See Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering
Without Permission, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 434, 438 (1898).
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decedent was a wilful trespasser; and indeed the court seems to have ac-
cepted this fact, notwithstanding its remark that ,... the Referee could have
found that he was at least a bare licensee." 73 Such a statement was made
merely arguendo, as is indicated by the language immediately following:
"Whether we regard him thus or technically as a trespasser, it does not neces-
sarily follow therefrom that defendants are not liable in negligence." 4 Al-
though the court deemed it immaterial whether the infant had been a licensee
or trespasser, in discussing the impact of the case on New York law, the fore-
going was necessary to show that the court was squarely presented with the
question of a landowner's liability for the death of an infant trespasser. If
the decedent's status as licensee or trespasser had been inconclusive and either
alternative had been an equally reasonable inference, much of the force of the
decision might be dissipated. In subsequent cases clearly involving trespassers,
courts, on stare decisis principles, might not feel bound by the instant case
and might attempt to distinguish it by reasoning that the decedent was a
licensee, to whom the defendant owed a duty of warning with respect to
latent and concealed dangers in the premises.
As aforementioned, the court apparently placed its decision on three grounds,
viz., acts of affirmative negligence, the creation of a deceptive trap, and the
maintenance of an inherently dangerous instrumentality on the premises.
Insofar as the third ground is concerned, the instrumentality in the princi-
pal case, although concededly dangerous, would not seem to be one contem-
plated by the rule of Travell v. Bannerman and the other cases in this classY5
Traditionally these cases have been concerned with electricity, fireworks, dy-
namite caps, and other articles of an explosive character. This is not to inti-
mate that New York has limited the inherently dangerous rule to explosives
and electricity; 7 6 however, in view of other decisions holding, for example,
that gasoline,77 alcohol,78 quicklimet 9 and film 0 are not inherently dangerous,
it would have seemed a fair inference, at least prior to the Mayer case, that
73. 307 N.Y. at 563, 122 N.E2d at 912. The facts of the case militate against the find-
ing of a license. See note 72 supra. Moreover, it does not appear that the premies in the
Mayer case were of the same character as those found in the implied invitation cases hereto-
fore discussed; nor does it appear that it was the custom to use such presnises as was the
fact in the latter cases. See cases cited note 57 supra.
74. 307 N.Y. at 563, 122 N.E.2d at 912.
75. See note 40 supra. In the following cases involving e.xploives, recovery was denied
solely because of intervening causes. Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 219 N.Y. CO, 113 N.E.
529 (1916); Hallenbeck v. Lone Star Cement Corp., 273 App. Div. 327, 77 N.YS.2d E07
(3d Dep't 1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 777, 87 N.E.2d 679 (1949); Babcock v. Fitzpatrick, 221
App. Div. 638, 225 N.Y. Supp. 30 (3d Dep't 1927), aff'd, 248 N.Y. 603, 162 N.E. 543
(1928).
76. Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.YS.2d 485 (2d Dep't 1953).
77. Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N.Y. 110, 19 NX.2d 931 (1939).
78. Hall v. New York Telephone Co., 214 N.Y. 49, 103 N.E. 182 (1915).
79. Beetz v. Brooklyn, 10 App. Div. 382, 41 N.Y. Supp. 1009 (2d Dep't 1896).
80. Beickert v. G.M. Laboratories, 242 N.Y. 16S, 151 N.E. 195 (1926).
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the rule was not to be too liberally extended.81 It is submitted that the courts
mean, by an inherently dangerous article, one which is hazardous per se, the
perils of which must be guarded against by the exercise of more than ordi-
nary prudence, rather than one which is hazardous only under certain con-
ditions and against which the exercise of ordinary care is a sufficient safe-
guard.8 2 In the Mayer case the court recognized that the hoistway had become
perilous only through the affirmative action of defendant in changing condi-
tions at the site of the injury and creating new perils there. Hence, it seems
an almost irresistible conclusion that the real ground of the decision lies not
in the fact that the court regarded the deceptively covered hoistway as an
inherently dangerous instrumentality within the rule of the previous cases,
and it would seem that the true rationale lies elsewhere.
Inasmuch as the court in the Mayer case stressed the affirmative character
of the acts which led to the death of the decedent, the decision might well be
grounded on the principle that a landowner may be liable for injuries to
trespassing children due to his affirmative, as distinguished from his mere
passive, negligence. Affirmative negligence imports active participation by de-
fendant in the event either at the time of the injury or prior thereto; 88
whereas, passive negligence usually results from mere failure to repair or where
defective conditions in property are permitted to continue until injury there-
from occurs.84 Concededly, the acts of the defendant in placing the flimsy
wooden slats over the hoistway were affirmative in character; however, we
have seen that in previous cases involving infant-trespassers, the courts ordi-
narily make no express distinction between affirmative and passive negligence88
and have granted recovery on such grounds that the article causing the in-
81. In a dissent in Hallenbeck v. Lone Star Cement Corp., 273 App. Div. 327, 343, 77
N.Y.S.2d 807, 821 (3d Dep't 1948), it was said as follows: "Emphasis should be placed
on the fact that in the cases on the subject of high explosives the rule announced in Travell
v. Bannerman (supra) has never been relaxed." But see Runkel v. City of New York,
282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (2d Dep't 1953), where the court considered a dilapi-
dated building, which had collapsed and injured two infants who had been within It at the
time, an inherently dangerous instrumentality. However, in that case the structure bordered
on a public highway and had been formally declared a public nuisance; so the case might
have been decided on the basis that the owner maintained a dangerous condition near a
public highway.
82. Unquestionably most explosives are highly dangerous and must always be handled
with great care. In strict logic it would seem that if fireworks are inherently dangerous
(Kingsland v. Erie County Agricultural Society, 298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949)), the
same should be true of gasoline, since both become dangerous only when ignited. It Is a
fact, however, that gasoline is in much more common use than fireworks and other ex-
plosives and evidently the courts have, only for practical reasons, refused to extend the
rule so as to include gasoline. See Flaherty v. Metro Stations, Inc., 202 App. Div. 583, 588,
196 N.Y. Supp. 2, 7 (4th Dep't 1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 605, 139 N.E. 753 (1923).
83. See Mayer v. Temple Properties, Inc., 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954). See
also James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 Yale L.J.
144, 174 (1953).
84. See Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N.Y. 181, 179 N.E. 378 (1932).
85. Cases cited notes 40, 49, 50 and 55 supra.
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jury was inherently dangerous or was maintained in or near a public place
rather than on the character of the defendant's negligence. In view of the
foregoing, the court's utilization of affirmative negligence as a ground of re-
covery and its attempt to distinguish previous cases-G in which the plaintiff
was unsuccessful as involving mere passive negligence, would seem of little
help towards clarification of the New York law on the subject of liability to
infant-trespassers. Concededly, a rule of liability based on such a distinction
may be of some merit; indeed, a rule which asserts liability for active but
not for passive negligence seems to square with the doctrine negating a duty
on the part of an owner to put his land in a safe condition for trespassers
and licensees while recognizing the modem view that, as to affirmative use of
property in a dangerous manner, the owner becomes liable to all those who
come within the zone of danger, i.e., the risk.8 7
Lastly, in view of the court's statement that the hoistway at the time of
the injury was ". . . a dangerous instrumentality in the nature of a perilous
trap... 2,s and its frequent mention of the word trap, one might infer that
the decision was intended to be based upon the so-called trap doctrine. At
common law, such doctrine forbade a landowner from setting spring guns
and kindred devices for the purpose of injuring a trespasser.8 9 From the very
nature of the word "trap" it would appear to be limited to intentional torts;
however, the courts in more recent casesPO have employed such term in refer-
ence to concealed dangers in land which have been created by the owner with-
out any preconceived intent of injuring others thereby. Thus it would seem
that the courts have broadened the word "trap" so as to include any danger-
ous condition on land which is not readily perceivable by the exercise of
ordinary care.91 Furthermore, in view of the fact that such decisions have in-
variably been concerned with licensees or invitees, 2 it might be said that
what constitutes a trap as to a licensee or invitee might not be a trap as to a
trespasser 3 Support for such a distinction may be found in the rule that
a landowner cannot ordinarily foresee the coming of a trespasser;9' whereas,
86. Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 296 N.Y. 154, 76 N.E.2d 447 (1947); Mendelo-
witz v. Neisner, 258 N.Y. 181, 179 NE. 378 (1932); Banmaijian v. Board of Education of
City of N.Y., 211 App. Div. 347, 207 N.Y. Supp. 298 (1st Dep't 1925).
87. Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of R(sponzibility in
Tort, 21 Mich. L. Rev. 495, 518 (1923).
88. See note 73 supra.
89. Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1323); State v. Green, 118 S.C.
279, 110 SE. 145 (1921); State v. Childers, 133 Ohio St. 503, 14 NXE.2d 767 (1938).
90. Garrow v. State, 268 App. Div. 534, 52 N.YS.2d 155 (3d Dep't 1944); Morrison v.
Carpenter, 170 Mich. 207, 146 N.W. 106 (1914); Brinilson v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 144
Wis. 614, 129 N.W. 664 (1911).
91. A trap has been defined as ... a danger which a person who does not know the
premises could not avoid by reasonable care and shill." Hayward v. Drury Lane Theatre,
2 K.B. 899, 913 (1917).
92. See note 90 supra. But see Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123
N.YS.2d 485 (2d Dep't 1953).
93. Bohlen, Torts at 198-200 (1926).
94. Cooley, Torts § 338 (1930).
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having given permission to the licensee or invitee, their presence is to be an-
ticipated and the occupier thus has a duty to put the premises in a safe con-
dition for them or to warn them of dangers not apparent to the eye. Thus
viewed, the application of the trap doctrine would seem to depend upon the
presence of either: (1) an actual intent to inflict injury or (2) a duty owing
to the plaintiff as a result of the grant of a license or invitation by the land-
owner.95 It should be noted that the broadening of the trap doctrine so as to
include conditions negligently created which are dangerous to persons lawfully
on the premises makes no real change in the landowner's liability. The law has
always imposed upon the landowner the duty of safeguarding the licensee
and invitee from dangerous conditions and pitfalls created by him and which
are not discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care.90 In the Mayer case,
however, there was no evidence that the defendant intentionally set a trap for
the infant nor was there a duty of care owing to him as in the case of a li-
censee or invitee. Nevertheless, the court granted a recovery on the theory of
negligence, stating three separate grounds.97 As a result of the Mayer case,
it might be said that the trap doctrine has been extended so as to impose lia-
bility upon a landowner for negligent as well as intentional injury to tres-
passers, and this would seem to be the true rationale of the decision. Whether
or not the rule of the Mayer case will be limited strictly to infant trespassers
remains to be seen. However, in view of the unprecedented circumstances
under which the court granted a recovery and the public policy of protecting
children from dangers which they are unable to appreciate, the rule would
seem inapplicable to adult trespassers.
Although the court reaffirmed its position that attractive nuisance is not
the law of New York, it is interesting to note that it stresses all but one
of the elements laid down in section 339 of the Restatement of Torts. This
section provides that:
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children
trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition which
he maintains upon the land, if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass,
and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and
which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death
or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area
made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as com-
pared to the risk to young children involved therein." 98
95. See note 93 supra.
96. Prosser, Torts §§ 77-78 (2d ed. 1955).
97. 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909.
98. Restatement, Torts § 339 (1934).
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As to the element of foreseeability, the court in the Mayer case emphasized
the fact that the premises adjoined a public school building and that defend-
ant had knowledge of the habit of children to enter the areaway adjoining the
platform by crawling under a certain gate. As to the risk and defendant's
knowledge of it, the court considered the creation of the hazardous situation
as "... an utter heedlessness of care commensurate with the risk involved, the
consequences of which may well have been anticipated."33 With respect to the
ability of the infant to appreciate the risk, the court treated it as a matter
of contributory negligence (to be proved by defendant) and a fact question,
and thus beyond the power of review. Finally, although no mention was made
by the court of the relative utility of the hoistway, as compared with the risk
involved,"'0 it appeared from the evidence that, to heat the building, coal had
been replaced by oil and that the hoistway was no longer in use, thus bringing
the case directly within the rule of the Restatement.
In the light of the foregoing, the Mayer case seems to be precisely that
type of case contemplated by the Restatement and it is submitted that the
court could have, by adopting its rule,10 set up a standard of liability which
combines reasonableness with simplicity of application. If apprehension should
be expressed that the Restatement rule, once accepted, would make drastic
changes in existing law and unreasonably burden property owners in the here-
tofore lawful use of their property, the requirement that the utility of the con-
dition be slight in comparison with the risk, if realistically applied, would seem
sufficient to allay such fears.' 02 Moreover, the scope of the rule of the Restate-
ment would not in logic seem to be any more inclusive than that laid down
in the Mayer case.
It would appear that the rationale of the Restatement, to wit, that there is
a duty, with respect to the use of land, to take ordinary care in preventing
harm to others when such injury is clearly foreseeable, is in harmony with
existing rules in the law of negligence and in addition gives due regard to the
sanctity of human life with the least possible restriction on rights in property.
99. 307 N.Y. at 565, 122 N.E.2d at 913 (1954).
100. That the courts have considered this factor see United Zinc & Chemical Co. v.
Britt, 264 Fed. 785, 787 (8th Cir. 1920), where the court said that there is le s hecitation
in imposing liability where " . . . the thing complained of is . . . put to no u-udul, orna-
mental or other purpose of enjoyment."
101. In Clifton v. Patroon Operating Corp., 271 App. Div. 122, 63 N.Y.S2d 597 (3d
Dep't 1946) the decision in favor of plaintiff was based directly on section 339 of the Re-
statement; unfortunately, however, the case never reached the Court of Appeals and thus
its effect on the law of New York is unclear.
102. It should be noted that the court in Mendelowitz v. Neimer, 253 N.Y. 181, 179
N.E. 378 (1932) quoted a tentative draft of the American Law Institutes section 339 which
did not at the time include elements (c) and (d). The language of the court that the
Restatement rule " . . . may be more liberal to the injured party than the long line of
decisions in this State," is not necessarily a repudiation of it; rather, it was merely said
that the case at bar did not come within the rule. This is the view taken by Clifton v.
Patroon Operating Corp., supra note 101.
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